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The great historical irony of the catastrophe
unfolding in Iraq is that the shock therapy reforms
that were supposed to create and economic boom that
would rebuild the country have instead fueled a
resistance that ultimately made reconstruction
impossible1.
INTRODUCTION
It is a delicate and pretentious endeavour to
examine Iraq in current times. It is delicate
in the sense that new facts and conse-
quences of the Coalition’s presence in Iraq
are broadcast on a daily basis and discussed
worldwide. Yet it is also pretentious because
of the impressive volume of academic work
about Iraq that has appeared during the last
four years. There is now a solid body of
scholarship on issues such as the Coalition’s
interpretation and misuse of occupation
law, the legality of the use of force, West-
ern imperialistic aspirations over Iraq, and
successes and failures of the Coalition Pro-
visional Authority’s administration of Iraq
in 2003 and 20042. Keeping those concerns
in mind, this paper establishes a discursive
trajectory across all these topics. I will ar-
gue that the modern evolution of occupa-
tion law is intertwined with the Coalition’s
misinterpretation and misuse of their obli-
gations under international law, and exam-
ine how a radical interpretation of
occupation law has affected the prospects
of democracy and stability in Iraq.
The expected outcomes of a military
occupation are to stabilize and to offer se-
curity to a territory during a limited period,
handing back control of the territory to the
local population according to the principles
of self-determination and non-intervention.
In concert with the very limited circum-
stances that permit an occupation in mod-
ern times, the Hague Regulations of 1907
and the Fourth Geneva Convention set
forth the obligations of occupying powers
in a restrictive fashion. The obligations of
the occupant are to “take all the measures
in his power to restore and ensure, as far as
possible, public order and civil life”3. Mod-
ern interpretations of occupation law have
understood the limits imposed by occupa-
tion law while attending to the imperatives
of international human rights law, which is
proactive in essence. On the one hand, an
effective protection of human rights implies
a proactive reformist attitude by occupying
powers not only on the level of human
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economic failure of the occupied nation.
On the other hand, occupying powers
should exercise their obligations in an ob-
jective manner, cognizant of the people’s
ultimate authority over their territory. A
disruption of the equilibrium imposed by
occupation law not only implies a breach
of international law, but also threatens the
long-term projects of democratic gover-
nance and stability in the occupied nation.
The transformative rationale and turbu-
lent consequences of recent events in Iraq
contain many lessons on how international
humanitarian law and occupation law have
evolved at the beginning of the twenty-first
century. Iraq was an epitome of a transgres-
sive occupation in terms of the necessity and
long-term impact of the reforms carried out
by the occupying powers. Once the Unites
States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK)
attacked Saddam Hussein’s regime on 19
March 2003 and began to exercise control
over Iraqi territory, the law of occupation
immediately applied to their actions. The
two governments soon recognized such
obligations. By late May 2003, the US and
UK governments and the United Nations
(UN) Security Council publicly confirmed
the application of occupation law in Iraq
rather than opt for the establishment of a
UN military deployment and civilian admin-
istration4. Although the Coalition, the UN
and other institutional actors used the dis-
course of human rights and democracy im-
plicit in occupation law, the Coalition
manifestly overstepped the proper scope of
an occupying power. The occupation was
particularly radical in the terrain of eco-
nomic governance, where the Coalition’s
reforms have been described as a ‘shock
therapy’ to Iraq: an upheaval of the status quo
with the intention of transforming Iraq into
a competitive, market economy, remodelling
the economic and social institutions of the
country.
SECTION I
Occupation Law emerged in the late eigh-
teenth century as a humanizing trend in the
law of war. The initial rationale of occupa-
tion law was to restrain full domination of a
territory by an occupying power until its
territorial rights had been formalized. As a
way of preserving the status quo ante bellum in
a territory, occupation law came to modify
the previously unencumbered right to sub-
jugate conquered foreign territories5. The
development and formalization of occupa-
tion law first occurred through codes of con-
duct. The historical reason behind the
appearance of these codes of war was that
the assumption of rights over a conquered
territory was typically brutal and punitive.
Codes of conduct for the occupier offered
the possibility to restrain misuses of power
and to maintain the distinction between
occupation and annexation, which would
otherwise effectively collapse6. These early
attempts to codify occupation show how
international law has never historically re-
garded occupied territories as a governance
vacuum.
Occupation law is currently understood
as the international law of military occupa-
tion, often accompanied by the civilian ad-
ministration of a foreign sovereign territory.
It is governed by relevant portions of the
Fourth Geneva Convention, relevant provi-
sions of Hague Regulations, and by peremp-
tory and customary international law. Some
of the primary obligations of the occupying
power include the prohibition on taking
possession of cash, funds, and realizable se-
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curities other than those which are strictly
the property of the State; the obligation to
administer public buildings, real estate, for-
est and agricultural estates belonging to the
hostile State in accordance with the rules of
usufruct; and the obligation for the occupier
to ensure, to the fullest extent of the means
available to it, the food and medical supplies
of the population7.
At the core of occupation law is the
principle that a belligerent occupation is in
essence a temporary condition, in which
the powers of the belligerent are not with-
out limit8. The Lieber Code: Instructions for the
Government of Armies of the United States in the
Field by Order of the Secretary of war Articles 31-
47 (1863) and the Declaration of Brussels Ar-
ticles 1-8 (1874) are of how certain
government activities have been consid-
ered the exclusive legitimate prerogatives
of the de jure sovereign regime, and cannot
be taken over by an occupying power9. The
constraints over occupying powers have
been encapsulated in a more modern fash-
ion in Article 43 of the Hague Regulations,
which stipulates:
The authority of the legitimate power having
in fact passed into the hands of the occupant,
the latter shall take all the measures in his
power to restore, and ensure, as far as
possible, public order and safety, while
respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the
laws in force in the country10.
Further, the scope of the prescriptive power
of the occupant, phrased in the cryptic “un-
less absolutely prevented”, was supple-
mented by Article 64, second paragraph, of
the Fourth Geneva Convention:
The Occupying Power may, however,
subject the population of the occupied
territory to provisions which are essential to
enable the Occupying Power to fulfil its
obligations under the present Convention,
to maintain the orderly government of the
territory, and to ensure the security of the
Occupying Power, of the members and
property of the occupying forces or
administration, and likewise of the
establishments and lines of communication
used by them11.
It is fundamental to note that while the
drafters of the Hague Regulations consid-
ered military necessity as the only relevant
consideration that could be invoked by
occupying powers in order to override the
domestic laws in place, the Fourth Geneva
Convention considered the welfare of the
population of the occupied territory as a
legitimate argument to replace legislation.
In this sense, the recognition of human
rights and the limitation of states’ ability to
make war –both notable achievements of
the twentieth century– have fundamentally
altered the practices of war.
Following the Hague Regulations and
the Fourth Geneva Convention restric-
tively, there are two objective criteria that
permit and delimit an occupier’s power to
carry out reforms to the legal environment
of an occupied territory. Firstly, actions
shouldn’t be undertaken “unless absolutely
prevented”, and secondly, reforms must be
limited to the welfare of the population12.
These central pillars impose basic primary
obligations on an occupying power. The
first obligation is that occupying powers do
not acquire sovereignty over territories.
The second is to leave the legal and politi-
cal structures of occupied territory intact so
“the occupier only assumes as much as the
displaced sovereign’s authority as is neces-
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more”13. The occupying power is only com-
petent to legislate in order to secure basic
rights, security and stability for the local
population.
Consequently, occupation law has
evolved with a strong attachment to a con-
servationist principle. Occupation law
strongly confines the legislative discretion
of an occupier during the period of occu-
pation, regardless of the substantive merits
of the reforms it is prepared to enact. The
limitations imposed on the occupying
power are generally considered to be con-
comitant with the alien occupier’s lack of
political legitimacy to rule over the inhab-
itants of an occupied territory. According
to GREGORY H. FOX, “the occupier possesses
no local legitimacy or necessary stake in the
welfare of the territory after it departs, [he]
is not competent to enact reforms that fun-
damentally alter governing structures in the
territory and create long-term conse-
quences for the local population”14. In this
way, the traditional view of the occupation
law considers that if the exercise of stan-
dards imposed by the Fourth Geneva Con-
vention improves the situation of the
territory, then those standards should be
achieved for the sake of the Convention,
and not due to the reformist spirit of the
occupying power.
Alternative modern interpretations of
the prerogatives and limitation of occupa-
tion law have suggested that the welfare of
the population may justify deviation from
the legislation in force and therefore allow
a wider spectrum of activism by an occupy-
ing power15. With the expanding obligation
acquired by the model of interventionist
state during the twentieth century, interna-
tional law has embraced the relationship
between a population’s welfare and the ex-
istence of an operative state. International
law has shown an increasing concern with
matters previously considered the exclusive
prerogative of national governments and
identified them as core global concerns. For
occupation law, this trend is reflected in the
increasing influence of international human
rights commitments on the interpretation of
the occupier’s obligations. The current ef-
forts to regularize international activism
have arisen partly because protecting the
current framework of human rights is a com-
plex task that requires a certain level of cen-
tralized and proactive control16. The
occupying power must fulfil a range of pro-
active humanitarian responsibilities that go
beyond its territorial boundaries, adhering at
the same time to explicit limitations in terms
of time and matter in the administration of
the occupied territory17.
Notwithstanding the well-recorded
development of occupation law, the use of
occupation law has proved problematic
throughout its history18. There are three
main reasons that are typically invoked to
explain the misuse and abandonment of
occupation law, all of which are salient to
the occupation of Iraq. Firstly, occupation
law has often been considered to be inac-
tive since the end of colonialism, the Dec-
laration on Friendly Relations19 and the
prevalence of the general prohibition of the
use of force by the UN Charter20. Sec-
ondly, the collapse of former colony states
was a reality envisaged by the UN as a ra-
tionale for a proactive role of international
actors. In this scenario, engaged govern-
ments were supposed extend their duties
beyond military and humanitarian tasks to
include a precautious re-establishment of
effective governments21. From supervision
of elections, such as in Cambodia in 1992,
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to the full-administration of a state, such as
took place in Kosovo, the UN Security
Council has approached insecurity and
governance failure within nation states with
an increasing activism over the last twenty
years22. Finally, states are increasingly con-
verging towards similar political and eco-
nomic values, as well as increasing their
engagement with supranational bodies,
whereas previously political systems, eco-
nomic systems and geographical bound-
aries have been important touchstones for
identity and self-determination23. These
three factors have generated considerable
difficulties for attempts to apply strict read-
ing of codified occupation law in practice.
The diversity of circumstances and proac-
tive obligations has made occupation law
an enormously complex legal framework
within which to work24.
In recent years, multilateral or humani-
tarian occupations, particularly those aimed
at enforcing international human rights in
failed states, have become the more rel-
evant fact in occupation practice25. Regime
change in its modern usage means the forc-
ible replacement of the elite/or governance
structure of a state by external actors so that
the successor regime approximates some
purported international standard gover-
nance26. If this sounds problematic, it is
because the impulses that have gone into
this new exercise of power are contradic-
tory27. On the one hand, human rights ide-
ology of the Western world sustains the
principle of self-determination, the right of
each people to rule themselves free from
outside interference. Although contentious,
this was the ethical principle that inspired
the decolonisation of Asia and Africa after
World War II28. More recently, however,
the world has witnessed the collapse of
many of these former colonies and there-
fore seen a reshaping of the principle of
self-determination based on the notion of
guaranteed international human rights29.
There are thus increasing calls for a re-
invigorated framework for occupation law:
liberating armies that operate with interna-
tional authority, advance democracy, and
save civilian populations from atrocities
should be regulated by a modern occupation
regime that can be created under the UN
Charter30. This idea resembles the Atlantic
Charter in terms of war engagement and its
consequences in modern times. Signed by
US President FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT
and British Prime Minister WINSTON
CHURCHILL in August 1941, the Atlantic
Charter calls for ‘the fullest collaboration
between all nations in the economic field
with the object of securing, for all, improved
labor standards, economic advancement and
social security’31. Thus in an increasingly
homogenous international scenario, highly
proactive occupations have come to be well
regarded and have passed the scrutiny re-
quired by the former occupation law. The
boundary between “humanitarian interven-
tion”, basically a short-term initiative aimed
only at stopping massive and ongoing hu-
man rights violations, and “regime change”
which in fact is future-oriented, has become
increasingly blurred32.
Even though there continues to be ex-
tensive academic discussion about the role
and limitations of the Security Council and
individual nations in relation to occupation
law, the end result of the mismatch between
formal and active understandings of occu-
pation law has been what might be called
“transformational occupation”33. Transfor-
mational occupations have repeatedly
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ers acting under the authority of the UN
Security Council, or even without explicit
Council approval. In the latter case, of
which Iraq is a clear example, individual
actors have initiated actions when the
Council is deadlocked and pursuant nations
consider that the threat to survival –or the
aspiration for self-determination– is immi-
nent and overwhelming in the target soci-
ety.34.
With the increasing acceptance of pro-
active use of force for humanitarian objec-
tives, JANE STROMSETH argues that a
Responsibility to Protect is beginning to
develop as a norm of customary international
law in the current environment of occupa-
tion law35. The preconditions that she ar-
ticulates for the nascent Responsibility to
Protect are: the UN Security Council is un-
able to authorize actions; it is necessary to
use force to stop atrocities; the force used is
proportional to stop ongoing human rights
abuses; there is a humanitarian purpose and
effect to the intervention; it is a collective
action; and finally the intervention is sup-
ported by existing law36. The Responsibil-
ity to Protect makes an adjustment to state
sovereignty by declaring that for a states’
sovereignty to be respected, a state must
demonstrate responsibility to its citizens37.
Since the Responsibility to Protect implies
responsibility to prevent, responsibility to
react and responsibility to rebuild, under-
standings of occupation law are undergoing
revision. On one hand, international law
continues to presume the inappropriateness
in all circumstances of the coercive use of
force to effect political change in another
state, while on the other hand, there is some
evidence that where the use of force does oc-
cur, there is an emerging obligation to inter-
vene and contribute to reconstruction38. Yet
even in this new conceptualisation of sover-
eignty, military intervention for humane
purposes is still an exceptional and extraor-
dinary measure. The International Commis-
sion on Intervention and State Sovereignty
emphasises the “just cause threshold” that
justifies the use of force as the responsibil-
ity to protect a serious and irreparable harm
occurring to human beings, or a large scale
loss of life or large scale “ethnic cleansing”
that is imminently likely to occur39. A right
intention of human protection, proportional
means in terms of duration and intensity of
the military intervention and the prospect of
a chance of success in halting or averting the
human suffering are not by themselves suf-
ficient reasons for action40. Instead of super-
seding occupation law, the nascent
Responsibility to Protect crafts an updated
framework for international intervention for
humanitarian causes.
There is thus an understandable con-
cern to ensure that occupying powers up-
hold human rights standards and also that
the economic survival of the occupied so-
ciety should not became the premise for
using occupation law as the means to treat
the occupied territory as a blank slate. In
the post-cold war era, free-market values,
respect and protection of property rights
and contracts, friendly investment policies
and multilateral and bilateral trade agree-
ments are increasingly becoming interna-
tional standards. With varying degrees of
compliance and willingness, developed and
developing countries are accommodating
their internal legal configurations to satisfy
these requirements. Although this process
has had a significant impact on the exercise
of economic governance domestically and
internationally, central and peripheral gov-
ernments have seen their range of eco-
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nomic policy choices shrink dramatically.
Civil activism, the growth of non-govern-
ment organization networks, regional alli-
ances, hard-lobbying policies and
economic blocks are a few of the antago-
nistic responses to the global market ideal.
This contentious context affirms the ab-
sence of a true global consensus about the
liberalization of national markets. There is
even a resurgence of the principle of au-
tonomy in choosing economic models41.
Emerging from colonialism, newly devel-
oping countries have reacted against West-
ern economic and political power by
defending a robust notion of sovereignty
enshrined in international law. Economic
and political differences have become pil-
lars of the principle of self-determination
and subsequently the whole international
legal structure42. For instance, the role of
economic law is still a contested matter of
legitimate diversity among states. It is le-
gitimate and meaningful in terms of delib-
erative democracy, for instance, for a state
to decide that utilities, media outlets, natu-
ral resource extraction, and other strategi-
cally important industries should be
government-owned or off-limits to foreign
ownership. Mutatis mutandis, this situation is
predicated of occupied territories and post-
occupation government. Otherwise, the
autonomy of territories would be vulner-
able to intervention by aggressive and be-
nevolent occupying powers alike.
It is important to realise that the ideal
of self-determination is not synonymous
with support for the continuation of laws
that clearly violate core human rights. The
degree of complexity with which this prin-
ciple should be understood gives room for
both a respect for human rights principles
and for the principle of self-determination.
Even when the primary motive for interven-
tion is the instauration of a government
based on the standards implied in interna-
tional agreed human rights instruments,
these standards are expressed in very gen-
eral principles and norms: the “margin of
appreciation” can be malleable to different
socio-economic perspectives. The com-
plexity of self-determination is already ac-
knowledged in the Declaration on Friendly
Relations, which establishes:
[b]y virtue of the principle of equal rights
and self-determination of peoples enshrined
in the Charter of the United Nations, all
peoples have the rights freely to determine,
without external interference, their political
status and to pursue their economic, social
and cultural development, and every State
has the duty to respect this right in
accordance with the provisions of the
Charter43.
An interpretation that calls for a necessary
equilibrium is supported by the preamble of
the Declaration, where the General Assem-
bly establishes: “Bearing in mind the impor-
tance of maintaining and strengthening
international peace founded upon freedom,
equality, justice and respect for fundamen-
tal human rights and of developing friendly
relations among nations irrespective of
their political, economic and social systems
or the levels of their development”44. Ex-
plicit in the Declaration is that even the
most well-intended reforms by a benevo-
lent occupying power may become so
sweeping and far-reaching that inhabitants
lose the opportunity to make important
choices about the nature of their own
society’s development. The equilibrium
between securing order while respecting
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that a culture of human rights and eco-
nomic growth are only compatible when
they are engendered by the people of the
nation. This shift of emphasis, from politi-
cal elites to peoples during an occupation,
is informed by the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion and the Hague Regulations45. The
Convention delineates a bill of rights for
the occupied population, which serves as an
internationally approved bill of rights for
the inhabitants of an occupied territory.
Both contributions establish guidelines for
the lawful administration of occupied ter-
ritories. They contribute to a growing
awareness in international law about the
role of peoples in the resurgence of a state.
No longer are inhabitants merely regarded
as the resources of states, but rather as the
worthy subject of protection46. Deferring
sweeping reforms until the return of an in-
digenous government allows both objec-
tives to be served: core human rights
obligations are respected through nar-
rowly-tailored reforms enacted during oc-
cupation, while self-determination remains
meaningful for the post-occupation devel-
opment of the society by prohibiting over-
reaching systemic changes.
II SECTION
For HILARY CHARLESWORTH, the war in Iraq
and its aftermath have shaken the founda-
tions of international law, but at the same
time they have underlined the real value of
the international legal system. Even though
international law has been inadequately
equipped to deal with structural injustices
in the past, its major strength has been the
insistence on a collective, rather than
individualised, notion of justice. In Iraq, the
flaws of international law were particularly
striking, but its purported strengths were
also profoundly distorted47.
After months of trying to rally interna-
tional support for a war and a two-day ulti-
matum demanding that Iraqi President
SADDAM HUSSEIN step down, the US at-
tacked Iraq on March 19, 2003. The goal,
US President GEORGE W. BUSH declared in
a speech was to disarm Iraq, to free its
people and to defend the world from grave
danger48. The 15-member Security Coun-
cil did not authorize the March 19, 2003
attack on Iraq. It had unanimously passed
Resolution 1441 on November 8, 2002,
calling for new inspections intended to find
and eliminate Iraq’s weapons of mass de-
struction49. The resolution also threatened
serious consequences if Iraq failed to com-
ply. Iraq accepted the renewed inspections,
which were to be carried out by the United
Nations Monitoring, Verification and In-
spection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
Under the terms of the resolution, if Iraq
obstructed their work, the chief inspectors
were to report promptly back to the Secu-
rity Council, which would have convene
immediately to consider the situation and
the need for full compliance50. The US,
backed by Britain and Spain (subsequently
known as the Coalition), began to seek a
second UN resolution to declare Iraq in
material breach of its obligation to dis-
arm51. However, permanent members
France, Russia and China, as well as a num-
ber of other members, preferred to give
inspectors more time on the premise that
inspections were working, and therefore
military action against Iraq would contra-
vene the restraining of use of force.
After the Gulf War of 1991, the US
pursued two simultaneous policy objectives
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toward Iraq. In the short term, the US
aimed to contain SADDAM HUSSEIN by keep-
ing him within the boundaries of Iraq,
while, in the longer term, the objective was
his overthrow52. For his part, SADDAM
HUSSEIN manoeuvred to maintain power in
Baghdad and keep the country together
against the influence of US and UN exter-
nal policies and popular uprisings by Kurds
and Shiite Muslims53. With some degree of
stability, the Ba’athist Regime defied predic-
tions of its imminent downfall and re-
mained in power, at times relying on the
international necessity of Iraq as a regional
counterweight to potentially resurgent Iran.
It was within this context that US admin-
istration lawyers in 2003 claimed that Iraq
had never lived up to the terms cease-fire
of the 1991 Golf War and that the use of
force against Iraq was now valid54. Against
a deeply divided UN Security Council, the
US pulled their proposal on March 17 in
order to pursue unilateral action. The US
administration argued that there was suffi-
cient legal support for its proposed military
action55. The legal rationale of the Coali-
tion was based on Resolution 1441 as well
as the previous Resolution 678, which au-
thorized the UN to take military action
against Iraq, and Resolution 687, which set
the terms of the cease-fire at the end of the
1991 Gulf War56. The disparate political
justifications for military action against Iraq
included preventive self-defence against
existing weapons of mass destruction (ac-
cording to the US National Security Strat-
egy57); the Iraqi ruling regime’s connections
to Al-Qaeda, and thus an integral part of
the war against terrorism; and, somewhat
belatedly, relieving the Iraqi people of ex-
tensive and continuing human rights viola-
tions58. None of these three possible bases
for justification were sufficient grounds for
multilateral action59. However, while there
were lengthy discussions about the legality
of the use of force and the facts that served
as a basis for the invasion, there were also
an apparent international political consen-
sus about the desirable outcomes of the
invasion and the need for political and eco-
nomic changes in the region. There was a
call for Iraq’s transformation into a more
democratic nation  thus promoting a more
stable Middle East– to which the US and
its Coalition partners promptly re-
sponded60.
Following the major military actions
against Iraq from March 20 to May 1, 2003,
President BUSH signalled the move form a
period of war planning and fighting to one
of rebuilding61. From the beginning of
Operation Iraqi Freedom, US and UK
forces recognized explicitly their condition
as occupying powers. Nonetheless, the
Coalition, the UN and the international
community also mutely accepted that the
project in Iraq was a transformational oc-
cupation –explicitly contrary to a restrictive
reading of occupation law– following lib-
eration from the Ba’athist administration62.
Although acknowledgment of the status of
occupants is the first and the most impor-
tant initial indication that the occupier will
respect the law of occupation63, a reform-
ist agenda of liberal, democratic and free
market principles was openly declared be-
fore the deployment of forces in Iraq64.
The major areas of Coalition reforms in
Iraq can be encapsulated in six transforma-
tional targets: De-Ba’athification65, Reform
of Security and Military Institutions66,
Human Rights Reforms67, Criminal Law
and Law Enforcement Reforms68, Good
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forms70. International support for the re-
forms was based on their consistency with
international legal standards, such as those
set out in human rights treaties, as well as
prevailing best economic governance prac-
tices followed by the most highly devel-
oped Western democracies71. General
Secretary Kofi Anan affirmed at the time
that while there were disagreements about
the way that actions were conducted in
Iraq, there was a strong desire to see a stable
and democratic Iraq – at peace with itself
and with its neighbours, and contributing
to the region72. A combination of these
factors allowed the occupiers to govern as
sovereigns, whose actions deposed the gov-
erning regime and transformed the country
in a permanent fashion.
The unique circumstances in Iraq re-
quired a tailor-made mandate from the Se-
curity Council to support the occupying
powers in the dual process of stabilization
and political transition. Regime change and
transformation are best accomplished au-
tochthonously, without external interven-
tion and especially without unilateral
intervention73. As W. Michael Reisman has
observed, “If there must be intervention, it
should be persuasive rather than coercive,
indirect rather than direct, and inclusively
authorized and accomplished rather than
exclusively and unilaterally effected”74. Ide-
ally, these principles of action should be
reflected in any occupation mandate that
foresees a regime change and sweeping lo-
cal transformation. The mandate should
subject the compliance of the occupying
powers with the Hague Regulations and
Fourth Geneva Convention, customary law
and peremptory law to serious scrutiny75.
Furthermore, the mandate should detail the
responsibilities and prerogatives of the oc-
cupying powers conceded under the Secu-
rity Council authority. In the case of Iraq,
the Coalition’s mandate should have (i)
placed the operation under the command
and control of the UN, (ii) included those
principles of occupation law that remain
relevant to the circumstances (including jus
cogens norms and erga omnes obligations), and
(iii) included other principles of modern
international law pertaining, for example,
to human rights, self- determination, the
environment, and economic development
so as to create a legal regime uniquely suited
to the territory76. Finally, the mandate
should have been enacted prior to the ini-
tial occupation of any part of Iraqi territory,
or at least after the more complete occupa-
tion of the country following the collapse
of Baghdad on April 7, 200377. The insti-
tutional elements of the UN Security
Council Resolution that eventually recog-
nized the occupation of Iraq were far from
this ideal prototype.
SECTION III
According to Resolution 1483, it is possible
to identify three institutional actors during
the period of occupation: the Coalition
Provisional Authority in Iraq (CPA), the UN
and its Special Representative and Assis-
tance Mission, and the Governing Council
of Iraq78. The interaction between these
institutional agents and the assignation of
roles to each of them were symptomatic of
the sui generis character of the occupation of
Iraq79. The US and the UK aspired to main-
tain a distinction between the prerogatives
of a de jure government; and, at the same
time, the limited legislative capacities of an
occupier. Ultimately, however, these cat-
egories made little sense when the inten-
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tions of regime change prevailed over the
limitations prescribed by occupation law. In
Iraq, the values of national sovereignty and
self-determination that are explicitly pro-
tected by occupation law became a space
for political and economic experimenta-
tion.
The principal actor and agent of regime
change and transformation during the pe-
riod of the occupation in Iraq was the CPA.
The US and the UK announced the cre-
ation of the CPA in a letter to the Security
Council on May 8, 200380. The new au-
thority would “exercise powers of govern-
ment temporarily” in Iraq81. With this
premise, on May 22, 2003, the UN Secre-
tary Council adopted Resolution 1483 that
established, the US and the UK as foreign
military powers in Iraq82. The Council
vested the CPA (termed “the Authority” in
the Resolution) with the specific authori-
ties, responsibilities, and obligations under
applicable international law83. The Security
Council called upon the CPA “to work con-
sistently with the Charter of the United
Nations and other relevant international
law, to promote the welfare of the Iraqi
people through the effective administration
of the territory, including in particular
working toward the restoration of condi-
tions of security and stability and the cre-
ation of conditions in which the Iraqi
people can freely determine their own po-
litical future“84. Citing UN Security Coun-
cil Resolution 1483, the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 and the Hague Regu-
lations of 1907, the CPA Regulation n.º 1
vested itself with executive, legislative, and
judicial authority over the Iraqi government
from the period of the CPA’s inception on
April 21, 2003, until its dissolution on June
28, 2004.
The timeframe of the CPA’s authority
was to be effective until an internationally
recognized, representative government was
established by the people of Iraq and as-
sumed the CPA’s responsibilities85. On June
28, when the CPA formally transferred po-
litical authority to the Iraqi Interim Gov-
ernment and left the country, it did not
intend that its dissolution would also cause
its many legislative actions to lapse. Besides
taking long-term binding decisions such as
the inclusion of Iraq in the World Trade
Organization and the signing of recon-
struction contracts, the CPA took two further
final steps to ensure that its enactments
would remain valid after the occupation
had ended. First, the Transitional Adminis-
tration Law (TAL), which came into effect on
June 28, 2004 following the official trans-
fer of power, provided that all the laws en-
acted by the CPA would “remain in force
until rescinded or amended by legislation
duly enacted and having the force of law”86.
CPA legislation would thus continue in force
unless the new government chose to opt
out.  Second, the CPA created the Iraqi In-
terim Government as a caretaker govern-
ment and issued a number of orders
specifically addressing the post-occupation
period under the leadership of this body87.
Most significant of these measures was that
the liberal economic reforms did not stop
with the change of administration of Iraq.
The CPA’s liberal economic reform of the
Iraq was continued by the TAL, and subse-
quently by the first, second and final draft
of the Iraqi Constitution that was approved
in a general referendum held on October
15, 200588.
The second institutional actor in the
occupation of Iraq was the UN. The role of
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in Iraq. As a natural consequence of the
agitated discussions in the Security Coun-
cil, it is more appropriate to read Resolution
1483 as an agreement that consolidated
conflicting views about the type of interna-
tional engagement required in Iraq, rather
than as a unilateral expression of will by the
international community89. From the out-
set, the Security Council “[r]esolved that
the United Nations should play a vital role
in humanitarian relief, the reconstruction of
Iraq, and the restoration and establishment
of national and local institutions for repre-
sentative governance”90. Nonetheless, the
UN’s institutional presence and the func-
tions delegated to its representatives were
weak in comparison with those of the CPA
during the occupation. Resolution 1483
created the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General (SRSG) to address a wide
range of substantive tasks “in coordination
with the Authority”91. The Resolution listed
nine responsibilities for the UN in the spec-
trum of humanitarian assistance, recon-
struction and coordination; none of these
involved an actual role in governing the
occupied territory92. In mid-August 2004,
the Security Council established the
United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq
(UNAMI) by the Resolution 1511. UNAMI was
created parallel to the SRSG. Its tasks were
as limited as those assigned to the SRSG, but
focussed on the elections planned to take
place after the CPA’s withdrawal from Iraq93.
By Resolution 1511, the Security Council
also authorized a multinational force in Iraq
under the unified command of the U.S. and
U.K.94. Even though the multinational
force enhanced the UN’s institutional pres-
ence, the Security Council did not have
final control over administrative matters,
nor any control over military decisions.
The operation was informed and decided
by U.S. military commanders and Admin-
istrators of the CPA, who reported to the
U.S. Secretary of Defence and, through
him, to the President of the U.S.95.
Resolution 1483 stresses the right of the
Iraqi people to exercise control over their
own natural resources, determine their own
political future freely and encourages ef-
forts by the people of Iraq to form a repre-
sentative government based on the rule of
law that affords equal rights and justice to
all Iraqi citizens without regard to ethnicity,
religion, or gender96. Based on Resolution
1483, the CPA formed the Iraq Interim Gov-
erning Council (Governing Council) in
August 2003 as part of the Iraqi governing
structure for the duration of the occupa-
tion97. The Governing Council preceded
the Iraqi Interim Government, which was
subsequently replaced by the Iraqi Transi-
tional Government. Though still subordi-
nate to the CPA, the Iraqi Governing
Council was given several key responsibili-
ties in collaboration with the CPA. Its duties
included appointing representatives to the
UN and appointing interim ministers to
Iraq’s vacant cabinet positions98. The Go-
verning Council also had the responsibil-
ity of drafting the TAL.
While the Security Council did call for
the creation of “an Iraqi administration”, the
Governing Council’s legitimacy was flawed
since inception. Firstly, its twenty-five
members were chosen and supervised by
the CPA99. Although Resolution 1483 or-
dered the creation of the Governing Coun-
cil and approved its establishment by the
CPA, the Governing Council lacked demo-
cratic legitimacy. The Governing Council’s
subordination to the CPA makes it difficult
to construe the Governing Council as a sov-
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ereign body of the people of Iraq. Secondly,
even though it was part of the structure of
an occupying power and as such only had
capacities that were limited in time, the
Governing Council breached these limita-
tions when it allowed the CPA Orders to ex-
ceed the time of occupation. More
specifically, in the TAL, Section A of Article
26, the Governing Council established
that: “Except as otherwise provided in this
Law, the laws in force in Iraq on 30 June
2004 shall remain in effect unless and until
rescinded or amended by the Iraqi Transi-
tional Government in accordance with this
Law”100. This complicity with the CPA per-
meated and undermined the sense of inde-
pendence and accountability that was
required from the Governing Council if it
were to act as an effective counterbalance.
Thirdly, the international norms that un-
derpin occupation law do not recognize
alter-power to the occupying power. More-
over, the Fourth Geneva Convention ex-
pressly banned the Governing Council
approvals of the CPA Orders and Memoran-
dums. Article 47 of the Convention pro-
vides that protected persons shall not be
deprived of the benefits of the convention
by any agreement concluded between the
authorities of an occupied territory and the
Occupying Power101. Authority to legislate
for the territory is reserved to the de jure
sovereign, and thus according to the stan-
dards of occupation law, the only recog-
nized legitimate representative bodies are
those chosen or constituted until after the
occupation is over. This was clearly not the
case of the Governing Council, which more
correctly must be regarded as an advisor to
the CPA, rather than a legitimate and demo-
cratic voice of the people that it was sup-
posed to represent102.
Departing from this institutional ar-
rangement, it is possible to draw a prelimi-
nary conclusion about the transformational
events in Iraq. A pragmatic reading of the
political and economic reforms carried out
by the CPA is that the Security Council did
not intend to alter the authority and trans-
formation exercised by the CPA. This is the
best available hermeneutic position to make
sense of such a sui generis situation. Under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Secu-
rity Council delegated authority to the CPA
to respond to the ‘threat to international
peace and security’ that Iraq represented for
the Council103. Subsequently, the Council
ratified the reformist agenda as an exercise
of its plenary power104. From the beginning
of the occupation, the Security Council was
reluctant to address CPA reforms. Further-
more, the UN as an institution explicitly
supported the economic reforms. On July
17th, 2003, Secretary General KOFI ANNAN
recalled the deterioration of Iraq’s economy
caused by successive wars, strict interna-
tional sanctions and debilitating economic
controls, and affirmed that the develop-
ment of Iraq required a transition from a
centrally planned economy to a market
economy105. The Security Council re-
minded the occupying powers of their hu-
manitarian law obligations and defined
broad goals for UNAMI and the SGRG, but it
stopped short of creating a binding man-
date for the occupation. Furthermore, Reso-
lution 1483 appealed to member states “to
assist the people of Iraq in their efforts to
reform their institutions and rebuild their
country”106. Such a broad statement can be
read either as tacit approval of the actions
that would be taken by the CPA, or that the
Security Council was recasting the words
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of protection for the local population. Ei-
ther way, the Security Council obscured the
CPA’s obligations and responsibilities under
occupation law by responding to the CPA’s
agenda in Iraq with a mixture of pragmatism
and oversight.
SECTION IV
Features such as the preventive rationale of
the attack, the unilateralism of the decision-
making process and activism with regard to
regime change that characterize the occu-
pation of Iraq have served to make Iraq a
test case for whether Coalition nations can
engender a liberal democracy and free-
market capitalism within the Arab world107.
In February 2003, President Bush spoke of
“a new Arab charter that champions inter-
nal reform, greater political participation,
economic openness and free trade”108. A
new regime in Iraq, he said, ‘would serve as
a dramatic and inspiring example of free-
dom for other nations in the region’109.
Shortly after the CPA commenced op-
erations, Administrator PAUL BREMER an-
nounced that economic reform was the
Coalition’s ‘most immediate priority’ and
‘[a]s we provide for Iraq’s security, we have
begun its political transformation’110. For
ROBERT OWEN, Bremer’s vision was a confir-
mation of how the reconstruction of Iraq
was monopolized by senior members of the
US Defence Department and how the re-
construction effort was based on a ‘wildly
over-optimistic scenario developed by the
neo-conservative ideologues in Washing-
ton egged on by members of the Iraqi op-
position in exile’111.  The CPA’s commitment
to and methodology for economic transfor-
mation was broadly based on the following
rationale:
a.  According to the CPA’s interpretation
of the law and usages of war, it had the re-
sponsibility to improve the conditions of
life, technical skills, and opportunities for
all Iraqis and to fight unemployment with
its associated deleterious effect on public
security. As expressed in its cumbersome
Order 39, the CPA was legally bound to de-
velop infrastructure, foster the growth of
Iraqi business, create jobs, raise capital, re-
sult in the introduction of new technology
into Iraq and promote the transfer of
knowledge and skills to Iraqis112.
b. In order to fulfil those expectations
effectively, the CPA identified problems aris-
ing from the domestic legal framework
regulating commercial activity in Iraq, and
the way in which the relevant legislation
had been implemented by the former re-
gime. Consequently, the CPA was necessar-
ily engaged in a process of legal reform in
order to underpin its developmental strat-
egy for Iraq.
c. Finally, the CPA was supported in such
reforms by the Governing Council and the
Report of the Secretary General to the Se-
curity Council on July 17, 2003. The latter
affirmed explicitly ‘the need for the develop-
ment of Iraq and its transition from a non-
transparent centrally planned economy to a
market economy characterized by sustain-
able economic growth through the estab-
lishment of a dynamic private sector, and the
need to enact institutional and legal reforms
to give it effect’113.
From 16 May 2003 to 28 June 2004, the
CPA enacted one hundred binding orders, a
substantial number of which concerned the
reformation of Iraq’s economy. Mistaking
the dimension of such a task, combined
with a lack of local knowledge and a naïve
underestimation of Iraqi opposition to the
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economic reforms114, the CPA’s orders col-
lapsed the four traditional phases of eco-
nomic transformation –stabilization,
liberalization, privatisation and legal and
regulatory reform– into a single exercise115.
The CPA simply ignored dissenting opinions
that its policies were not only rather blatant
attempts to shape Iraq’s economy in the
interests of the countries belonging to the
Coalition and other foreign investors, but
also against the interests of Iraqis them-
selves116.
Announced as an “exciting economic
transformation”, the areas of the CPA’s eco-
nomic reforms in Iraq mirrored the eight-
point action plan presented by the CPA
administrator Paul Bremer at the World
Economic Forum 2003 in Davos (see Annex
1, Table I). The reforms covered eight
broad areas: banking, taxation, foreign
trade and investment, private economic
transactions, securities regulation, regula-
tory reforms, state-owned enterprises and
economic governance and performance. As
such, the reforms emulated the “Washing-
ton consensus” prescriptions: fiscal disci-
pline, public expenditure contraction, tax
reform, financial liberalization, floating
exchange rates, trade liberalization,
friendly foreign direct investment policies,
privatization of state-owned enterprises,
market deregulation and sanctity of prop-
erty rights117.
According to these criteria, the CPA is-
sued its binding orders updating Iraq’s
economy with standards of Western eco-
nomic law. These included opening Iraq to
the flows of the international market118,
reforming finance and bank law and con-
solidating the figure of a central bank119,
granting all foreign contractors operating
in Iraq immunity from Iraqi legal pro-
cesses120, suspending all tariffs121, and es-
tablishing mechanisms of anti-corruption
governance on a national and industrial
level122. The most iconic of the reforms was
the establishment of a sturdy liberal regime
of foreign direct investment. Introduced by
CPA Order 39, this reform has become a
flashpoint for the major critiques against
the economic reforms and, more generally,
US political aspirations in Iraq. The new
treatment for investors in Iraq was put forth
in this way: “A foreign investor shall be
entitled to make foreign investments in Iraq
on terms no less favourable than those ap-
plicable to an Iraqi investor”, and “[t]he
amount of foreign participation in newly
formed or existing business entities in Iraq
shall not be limited”. Additionally, it states
that the foreign investor “shall be autho-
rized to... transfer abroad without delay all
funds associated with its foreign invest-
ment, including shares or profits and divi-
dends”123.
Order 39 encapsulates all key provisions
of trade and investment agreements that are
heavily contested by countries, regions and
multilateral fora124. As MARY LOU MALIG has
observed, although it is no more than six
pages long, Order 39 “disguises its true
weight, for it carries with it the same impact
of an investment agreement that usually take
years for countries to agree upon”125. KAMIL
MAHADI, for instance, argues that the CPA
Regulations, Orders and Memorandums,
and the subsequent crystallization of the
economic reforms in the new Iraqi Consti-
tution, have helped to create a society based
largely on speculation and profiteering, to
the sole benefit of interest groups associated
with such activities126. In the same vein, he
argues that the occupying powers in Iraq
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tic industry –public and private– might re-
generate and left the country immersed in a
vicious circle of poverty and insecurity. A
clear example is the disbanding of the Iraqi
army and the radical process of De-
Ba’athification in the public service, which
left a large number of men without income
or purpose. This not only multiplied the
number of unemployed in Iraq, but also
added strength to the organization of insur-
gency and intensified ethnic conflict127.
Unlike the former Soviet states, Iraq had
a private sector and a strong business culture
prior to the occupation. A market-oriented
reform programme would not have found
many enemies if it had aimed to support the
private sector while rehabilitating the pub-
lic sector, and if it had left the issue of
privatisation until the restoration of normal-
ity and constitutional government128. None-
theless, severe financial constraints imposed
in abnormal circumstances, together with
price and foreign exchange measures, have
ruined the Iraqi public sector and prepared
it for a “bargain sale”129. Even though there
are signs of economic revitalization in cer-
tain sectors130, Iraqi companies are strug-
gling to compete after years of severe
shortages of key inputs such as capital and
technology. Moreover, although the surge of
imports under the new government’s free
trade policies have helped to keep inflation
down, it has placed a severe strain on exist-
ing companies and discouraged investment
by new Iraqi entrepreneurs.
The provision on national treatment in
Order 39, which forbids discrimination
between national investors and foreign in-
vestors, instead could have ordered inves-
tors to utilize a certain percentage of
domestic content in goods, to employ lo-
cals, or to revitalized national industries so
as to build the domestic capacity. Govern-
ments have traditionally used measures
such as joint ventures or technology trans-
fer to help the local economy and to spread
the benefits of foreign investment to local
communities. Promoting private-sector
growth in post-conflict environments re-
quires more than removing legal barriers to
private economic activity. Private sectors
that have been ravaged by war and re-
pressed by state control cannot recover
without aggressive assistance to provide
credit, training, and opportunities131. Yet
under the economic conditions introduced
in Iraq, there was no requirement to rein-
vest corporate profits or to ensure that at
least a portion of the profits was recycled
into the Iraqi economy. In October 2003,
Iraq’s interim trade minister and now Min-
ister of Trade Ali Abdul-Amir Allawi
warned against forcing his nation’s
economy to mould itself rapidly into a free-
market system, saying that a swift change
would fuel unemployment and heighten
political instability. For him, “we suffered
through the economic theories of social-
ism, Marxism and then cronyism … [n]ow
we face the prospect of free-market funda-
mentalism”132.
The new Iraqi Constitution, approved
on 15 October 2005, epitomises the out-
comes of the Coalition’s interpretation of
occupation law and its impact upon the sta-
bility and security of Iraq. The priority of
economic reform for the CPA permeated the
Constitutional drafting process. The sec-
tions of the Constitution that fully embrace
the liberalization of Iraq’s economy differ
somewhat to earlier drafts of the Constitu-
tion. As late as June 30 2005, drafts of the
Constitution made repeated calls for “social
justice” as the basis of building a new Iraqi
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society. These early intentions embraced
every Iraq’s right to education, health care,
housing and other social services, placing
the state as the Iraq people’s collective in-
strument for achieving development. How-
ever, in many ways, the approved
Constitution continues the controversial
reforms enacted by the CPA and the norms
that the Iraqi Governing Council set on the
TLA133. The Constitution shifted during the
negotiations from an emphasis on social
security towards a focus on striving to
achieve high levels of economic effi-
ciency134. According to an August 2005
survey conducted by the International Re-
publican Institute, 60.80% of Iraqis from
across the country wanted the Constitution
to establish “a strong central govern-
ment”135. Furthermore the Constitution’s
treatment of oil production and revenues is
linked with the federal structure of the new
Iraqi state. This situation presents a num-
ber of unattractive scenarios to the Sunnis,
who live mostly in the oil-dry centre of Iraq
between both the northern Kurdish and
southern Shi’a rich oil-regions136. More
precisely, the main concern is that the Con-
stitution as currently worded could lead to
several autonomous zones so that a central
government in Baghdad would not have
complete control over oil resources. In the
longer term, it is possible that decentralized
government could lead to faster develop-
ment of Iraq’s oil and gas fields. On the
other hand, Sunni dissatisfaction with the
Constitution, and the underlying sense of
legal instability and contractual chaos, have
agitated insurgency and discouraged for-
eign investment137.
Over and above the breaches of occupa-
tion law in Iraq, it is problematic that the
relationship between economic growth and
democracy in Iraq was understood in a
ready-made and determinist way by the
CPA138. The occupation was characterised by
optimistic conceptions of modernisation as
mutually reinforcing sequences of economic
growth, social and political stability, national
integration and democratisation. There was
an implicit assumption by the Coalition that
capitalist development would mobilize so-
ciety in a way that alters traditional politi-
cal, cultural, and social organization and the
informal institutional frameworks of the Iraqi
people. That self-determination is a pivotal
value implying ownership was not
recognised. A further central assumption by
the Coalition was the autonomy of the po-
litical system vis-à-vis the rest of society. The
CPA adopted the contested premise “develop-
ment first, democracy later”, which assumes
that poor countries must develop economi-
cally before they can democratise139. De-
parting from these considerations, the
Coalition believed that CPA ’s economic re-
forms could be carried out in a vacuum of
legitimacy and still ensure stability and eco-
nomic progress140.
Even though the CPA’s economic plans
acknowledged the dire impact of increas-
ing economic inequality on democracy, it
failed to interrogate the distributional im-
plications of its own market-reform poli-
cies. The CPA Orders, and the broader
narratives used by its counterparts, assumed
that democratic prospects are enhanced
when economic inequality decreases and
the balance of class power moves in favour
of subordinate interests141. Yet the reality
is that such efforts in Iraq have produced
superficial forms of democratisation that do
not make sense for common people142. It
was not for the US, or any other country
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trade laws Iraqis must live by, and there was
a total failure to recognise that such rules
can only be legitimate if they are passed
initially by an elected Iraqi government free
of foreign occupation and domination143.
The Coalition believed that invading Iraq
would be easy, that Saddam Hussein’s mili-
tary would crumble, and that the troops
would be welcomed as a liberator. They
failed to comprehend that Iraq has long
been an occupied and externally manipu-
lated country with complex ethnic realities.
Consequently, Iraqis understandably regard
the occupation, and the suite of imported
economic and legal transformations, as yet
another episode of outside exploitation144.
Prior to the occupation of Iraq, the as-
sumption that there is a direct link between
economic growth and democracy had al-
ready revealed as flawed in a number of
different political and cultural contexts.
When the Berlin Wall fell, the countries of
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union began transitions to a market
economy, with heated debates over how
this should be accomplished. One choice
for Eastern Europe was “shock therapy”
–quick privatization of state-owned assets
and abrupt liberalization of trade, prices,
and capital flows– while the other was
gradual market liberalization to allow for
the rule of law to be established at the same
time145. With the intention of paring back
state control over the country’s economies,
radical liberalizing reforms neglected the
interdependencies between economic
growth, security, democracy, and social
well-being.
The reduction of state activity in East-
ern Europe was often confused or deliber-
ately misconstrued as an effort to reduce
state capacity overall, in order to propel
market solutions. JOSEPH STIGLITZ saw these
same contradiction repeated in the whole
process of occupation and reconstruction in
Iraq. It was clear to STIGLITZ that the most
important task –beyond creating a demo-
cratic state and restoring security– was re-
constructing the economy. Nevertheless,
STIGLITZ affirmed that during the period of
occupation, the Coalition was “blinded by
ideology” and seemed determined to con-
tinue its record of dismal failures by ignor-
ing the appalling outcomes of shock therapy
in such dissimilar countries as Bolivia and
Russia146. Instead of countries that have un-
dertaken a gradualist approach to the pro-
cess of economic reform, shock-therapy
countries have typically seen incomes
plunge and poverty soar147. By trying to
leapfrog into a laissez-faire economy, these
countries have witnessed social indicators,
such as life expectancy, fall at the same time
as producing dismal GDP figures148. More
than a decade after the beginning of transi-
tion, many postcommunist countries have
not returned to pre-transition income levels.
Unfortunately, the prognosis for establish-
ing a stable democracy and the rule of law
in most shock-therapy countries remains
bleak149.
Contemporary economic literature is
replete with examples of problems stemming
from the shock therapy in South America
and Eastern Europe than can now be applied
to Iraq. These include: (1) increased concen-
tration of wealth in the hands of the very
rich150; (2) increased unemployment and
underemployment; (3) wages that remain
low for those who still have jobs; (4) de-
creased power of trade unions under the
pressure of economic globalization151; (5)
increased crime as more people become eco-
nomically marginalized152; (6) increased
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numbers of police and prisons to combat the
increase in crime153; (7) increased
homelessness and street begging; (8) an ero-
sion of civil liberties; (9) rural depopulation
as small farmers are put out of business by
corporate agribusiness which, with free trade
can take full advantage of its economies of
scale sweeping away agriculture of means as
a mean of subsistence154; (10) armed resis-
tance by traditional cultures put under eco-
nomic siege155; (11) increased skilled and
unskilled migration to more economically
developed countries by those who no longer
have land to work and/or cannot find work
in the cities156; (12) an increasingly irrel-
evant political system that is unable and/or
unwilling to start a genuine, democratic de-
bate because it is controlled by interlocking
corporate interests that have the most to
gain from the status quo157; and (13) finally,
an alarming decrease in social solidarity158.
FINAL REMARKS
A literal interpretation of Article 43 of the
Hague Regulations, which prohibits
change to the laws in force in an occupied
territory ‘unless absolutely prevented’, sug-
gests the CPA’s economic reforms were con-
trary even to modern interpretations of
occupation law159. While some changes to
the legislation and administrative structures
of Iraq may have been permissible on the
basis of security, public order, or furthering
humanitarian objectives, on the basis of the
Fourth Geneva Convention, more wide-
ranging reforms in terms of economic gov-
ernance in Iraq were not lawful. Besides
changes in security and law enforcement,
which directly affected the CPA’s ability to
keep civil order and deal with the ongoing
insurgency challenging its authority, a lit-
eral reading of the Hague Regulations and
the Fourth Geneva Convention would hold
that the CPA economic actions were unre-
lated to the orderly administration of the
territory. All of the changes were signifi-
cant, transformative and intended to last.
The CPA believed that Iraqi prosperity re-
quired abandoning the old central planning
model in favour of liberal market policies.
But this economic paradigm shift was not
essential to providing basic means of sub-
sistence to Iraqis. Had the old economic
structures remained in place, the CPA would
still have been able to provide for Iraqi
people’s basic needs.
Even taking into account that the
Fourth Geneva Convention imposes affir-
mative obligations on occupying powers,
the Convention does not give enough sup-
port for such changes. Claims of necessity
are restricted in the terms of the Geneva
Convention and can only address condi-
tions that exist during the occupation160.
Virtually none of the CPA legislation was
rescinded after the transition to Iraqi rule.
Post occupation administration should not
be constrained, a fortiori, to a specific poli-
tic or economic template. This is effectively
what happened in Iraq. The Transitional
Administration Law and CPA’s Order No.
100 created an opt-out system. They en-
sured that CPA laws would continue in force
unless affirmatively repealed. The eco-
nomic reforms were not intended solely (or
even primarily) to prevent the CPA from
transgressing rights of economic subsis-
tence. Instead, they were long-term and
forward-looking, intended primarily to
catapult the political and economic reforms
after the occupation had ended.
The Security Council Resolution 1483
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mandate with respect to both the institu-
tional arrangement of the occupation and
the substantial changes that it allowed to
take place in Iraq during the occupation
period. The Resolution and its effects were
basically antagonistic to the core of occu-
pation law. Four features of the Resolution
are especially salient:
(i) Even though the Coalition and Secu-
rity Council’s intentions in Iraq were for re-
gime change and a transformational
operation, Resolution 1483 and later Resolu-
tion 1511 recognized the US and UK as oc-
cupying powers bounded by the restrictive
obligations under the Geneva Conventions of
1949 and the Hague Regulations of 1907161.
(ii) On the other hand, the UN did not
have a leading role in Iraq. Instead, the
Security Council and the Secretary General
mutely accepted the CPA’s actions that were
in breach of the Hague Regulations and the
Fourth Geneva Convention.
(iii) The Resolution did not establish
the principles that should have governed
the relationship and limitations between
the CPA and the people of Iraq during the
period of occupation. A proper representa-
tion of the Iraqi people, and a better appre-
ciation of the circumstances of Iraq, could
have improved the CPA drastic mishandling
of occupation law162.
(iv) Finally, the CPA initiated a radical
process of reform in Iraq during the occu-
pation, disregarding the intrinsic danger of
such caustic reforms in an already fragile
society.
There is still a strong argument that the
body of occupation law best protects the
civilian population, because that is what it
was originally designed to accomplish163.
The increasingly prevalent view that (i)
there is a “responsibility to protect”, (ii)
humanitarian intervention is an interna-
tional commitment, (iii) well-intentioned
governments should be able to rescue civil-
ian population at risk, and (iv) democracy,
human rights and the free market are glo-
bal values, do not and should not point to
a new interpretation of occupation law.164
There is a convincing case for retaining
occupation law as a principle in order to
guard the self-determination of people and
discipline aggressor armies and hold them
accountable for their actions on foreign
territory. It is vital to recognize the impor-
tance of a territory’s people as the very ba-
sic argument that sustains the structure of
occupation law, and confers the UN Char-
ter, Fourth Geneva Convention, peremp-
tory law and customary law with an
intrinsic logic. If the main purpose of the
international community’s involvement in
the internal affairs of countries is the well-
being of the local population in holistic
terms, then transformational occupation
should attend to that angle of self-determi-
nation that recognizes the people them-
selves as the key to a real process of
reconstruction. This recognition must go
beyond vague calls for democracy, human
rights, good governance and economic
growth. In the context of state-building, it
is difficult and indeed culturally arrogant to
determine what sort of contextually work-
able regime should replace an overthrown
local government.
As EDWARD AMADEO and TARIQ BANURI
note, the failure of the state does not derive
from its refusal to adhere to a theoretical
dogma. Rather, ‘it derives, in the short run,
from its abandonment of the goal of gov-
ernance in favour of theoretical certitude;
and in the long run, from its inability or
unwillingness to create or modify institu-
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tions to facilitate the management of con-
flicts which are forever changing in form
and intensity’165. In Iraq, the ideological
premises of the CPA’s reforms severely lim-
ited attempts at democratic governance by
foreclosing debates on a wide range of is-
sues in political economy, such as income
distribution, taxation, and protection or
non-protection of certain economic activi-
ties. In a society where democracy and sta-
bility are aims, the outcomes of such
debates cannot be fixed a priori166 but must
themselves must be subject to democratic
contestation167.
ANNEX 1.
TABLE. KEY TOPICS OF CPA’S ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE REFORMS IN IRAQ
Key Topics of the Economic
Reform168
1. Start a thoroughgoing reform of Iraq’s
financial sector in order to provide
liquidity and credit for the Iraqi economy;
2. Simplify the regulatory regime so as to
lower barriers to entry for new firms,
domestic and foreign;
3. Review Iraq’s body of commercial law
to determine which changes are needed to
encourage private investment;
4. Lift unreasonable restrictions on
property rights;
5. Develop anti-trust and competition
laws;
6. Develop an open market trade policy
providing for a level playing field with
regional partners;
7. Encourage the adoption of laws and
regulations to assure that Iraq has high
standards of corporate governance;
8. Develop accelerated training programs
for business managers in best practices and
business ethics.
Key Areas CPA Orders169
Banking Order n.º 40: Bank Law
Order n.º 56: Central Bank Law
Order n.º 94: Bank Law
Taxation Order n.º 37: Tax Strategy 2003
Order n.º 49: Tax Strategy 2004
Order n.º 38: Reconstruction Levy
Foreign Trade Order n.º 12: Trade Liberalization
and Investment Order n.º 20: Trade Bank of Iraq
Order n.º 39: Int. Private Ownership,
National Treatment, Free-Flow of Funds,
Leases of Real Property to Foreigners.
Private Order n.º 64: Corporate Law
Economic Order n.º 78: Amendment commerce
Transactions Code & correlated.
Order n.º 80: Intellectual Property Law
Order n.º 83: Copyright Law
Security Order n.º 18: Interim Law on Security
Regulation Markets.
Regulatory Order n.º 65: Communication & Media
Reforms Commission
Order n.º 66: Traffic Code
State-Owned Order n.º 76: State Owned-Enterprises
Enterprises Order n.º 75: Military Industrial Enterprises.
Governance Order n.º 55: Public Integrity Commission
& Market Order n.º 57: Iraqi Inspector General
Performance Order n.º 59: Incentives for Whistleblowers
Order n.º 77: Board of Supreme Audit
Order n.º 87: Public Contracts
Order n.º 93: Anti-Money Laundering
Order n.º 95: Financial Management Law
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